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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - STATE REGULATION OF EXPORTS OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR - On being refused a license,
a carrier operating under the provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Act 1
sought to enjoin public officials of Kentucky from enforcing the penal and
contraband portions of the Kentucky Liquor Law,2 which required a license
from the state as a prerequisite to the right to transport liquor. Plaintiff claimed
that the state act was a violation of its rights under the commerce clause in that
the requirement of the license placed an unconstitutional burden on its right
to transport liquor in interstate commerce. On appeal from a federal threejudge court's ruling sustaining a motion to dismiss,3 it was held that the application of the Kentucky act to an interstate carrier was constitutional; decree
affirmed. Zijfrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 60 S. Ct. 163 (1939).
The decision can only be justified on the theory that the case falls within the
purview of the established doctrine that a state may burden interstate commerce
if reasonably necessary to protect vitally important state interests.4 Under this
doctrine it has been held that a state may enforce reasonable quarantine regulations to protect the morals, health, safety, and welfare of its people. 5 Where
the articles involved are not legitimate articles of commerce and the state
policy seems desirable, regulation of exports has been upheld even though it
burdened interst:;ite commerce directly. 6 The exact basis for the Court's decision
in the principal case is not clear. However, since intoxicating liquor, long considered a proper object of commerce,7 is now interpreted as a commodity that
is subject to Congressional prohibition,8 the validation of the Kentucky act, which

49 Stat. L. 543 (1935), 49 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 301.
Ky. Acts (1938), c. 2, Stat. (Baldwin, Supp. 1938), c. 81, § 2554b-97 et seq.
3 Zi.ffrin, Inc. v. Martin, (D. C. Ky. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 924.
4 RorncHAEFFER, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, §§ 148-150 (1939). See
also the exhaustive list of cases recognizing this doctrine in South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 at 188, note, 58 S. Ct. 510 (1937).
5 Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. Ry., 181 U.S. 248, 21 S. Ct. 603 (1900); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 S. Ct. 488 (1897); Asbell v. State
of Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 28 S. Ct. 485 (1907); RoTTSCHAEFER, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 153 (1939).
6 Prohibiting export of citrus fruit unfit for consumption, Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237
U.S. 52, 35 S. Ct. 501 (1915); prohibiting export of animal carcasses not slaughtered
for food, Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 59 S. Ct. 609 (1938).
7 Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 125 U. S. 465, 8 S. Ct. 689, 1062 (1888);
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, IO S. Ct. 681 (1890).
8 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U. S. 3u, 37 S. Ct. 180
(1917); Corwin, "Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce-A Crucial Constitutional
Issue," 1 8 CoRN. L. Q. 4 77 passim ( 1933) .
1
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directly burdens interstate commerce, may be explained on the theory that
the Twenty-first Amendment 9 and legislation of the type of the Wilson 10
and Webb-Kenyon 11 acts have indicated a general trend of policy toward
recognizing that liquor is not a legitimate article of commerce and that its
regulation should be left largely to the states. 12 The opinion mentions the
Twenty-first Amendment 13 _and then states that the power in the state to
prohibit the manufacture of liquor for any purpose, even for an intended export
user, includes the lesser power to regulate export and the manner of exportation of liquor manufactured within the state.14 It would seem that this conclusion should be qualified by the proviso that such regulation must not impose
unconstitutional conditions. 15 Prohibiting a carrier, authorized by the Federal
Motor Carrier Act to transport interstate goods, from engaging in the transport of liquor in such commerce without a state license might be an unconstitutional condition, as it deprives the carrier of a constitutional right to engage
in interstate commerce. Therefore, the constitutionality of strict state regulation
of interstate carriers of liquor manufactured in the state would seem to depend
on the reasonable necessity for such regulation to protect its citizens from the
evils of intoxicants as compared with the resulting hardship imposed on interstate commerce.16 The court evidently believes that the gain to the state outweighs the obstruction placed on commerce._ The principal case is an extreme
9

U. S. Constitution, Amendment 21, § 2.
26 Stat. L. 313 (1890), 27 U.S. C. (1934), § 121.
11
37 Stat. L. 699 (1913), re-enacted 49 Stat. L. 877 (1935), 27 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 122. See Rogers, "State Legislation under the Webb-Kenyon Act,"
28 HARV. L. REV. 225 (1915).
12
I I TEMP. L. Q. 247 (1937); 3 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 636 (1936); 14 N. Y.
UNIV. L. Q. 361 (1937). In Commonwealth v. One Dodge Motor Truck, 123 Pa.
Super. 311, 187 A. 461 (1936), affirmed on lower court's opinion, 326 Pa. 120,
191 A. 590 (1937), which was based on a reasonable exercise of the police power,
the court strained the meaning of the Webb-Kenyon Act to uphold a Pennsylvani~
statute declaring it to be unlawful to transport intoxicating liquor within the state
without a permit from the state, even though it applied to a carrier transporting liquor
to a point outside the state.
18
In terms the Twenty-first Amendment applies only to imports: "The transportation or importation into any state ••. for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." One state court has
held that, although the Twenty-first Amendment applies to imports, it does not
authorize a state to regulate the shipment of intoxicants transported through a state.
Williams v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 857, 192 S. E. 795 (1937).
14 Principal case, 308 U. S. 132 at 138, citing Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9
S. Ct. 6 (1888), Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. North Carolina, 245 U.S. 298, 38 S. Ct.
96 (1917), and Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U. S. 311, 37
S. Ct. 180 (1917). See also Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 700, 34 S. Ct. 464 (1913).
15
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. I at 54, 30 S. Ct. 190 (1910).
See Oppenheim, "Unconstitutional Conditions and State Powers," 26 MICH. L. REv.
176 (1927); also Hale, "Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights,"
35 CoL. L. REV. 321 (1935); 37 CoL. L. REv. 307 (1937); 53 HARV. L. REV.
671 (1940).
16
RorncHAFER, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 150 (1939).
10
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example of the power of a state validly to interfere with interstate commerce,
and perhaps the policy of the state does not necessitate this decision. However,
it may be said that the Kentucky -act was a reasonable means of effectuating
a legitimate state policy, because the rigid control contemplated by the act
would undoubtedly go far in regulating local sale of liquor by focusing attention
on those few interstate carriers permitted to transport it. Nevertheless, if the
purpose of the state were merely to prevent bootlegging in order to insure
collection of a tax on all local liquor sales, it is doubtful if that end would
justify the burden imposed. Certainly the necessity for state interference should
be very great before the right to engage in interstate commerce is impaired.17

17 The

principal case is noted in 53 HARv. L. REV. 67 I

(I

940).

